Third Edition
CQ PressInstructors' ResourcesChaptersCh. 1 Logic of American PoliticsCh. 2 The ConstitutionCh. 3 FederalismCh. 4 Civil RightsCh. 5 Civil LibertiesCh. 6 CongressCh. 7 The PresidencyCh. 8 The BureaucracyCh. 9 The JudiciaryCh. 10 Public OpinionCh. 11 Voting, Campaigns and ElectionsCh. 12 Political PartiesCh. 13 Interest GroupsCh. 14 The News MediaAbout the BookAbout the Authors The Logic of American Politics by Samuel Kernell and Gary C. Jacobson

Chapter One: Logic of American Politics

Skillset: The Prisoner's Dilemma

In this skillbuilder, we go over the concept of the Prisoner's Dilemma, which was introduced in your chapter on page 9. In particular, we'll be using the example from pages 14 and 15 of your text to help you interpret the game shown below. Recall that in this example, President George W. Bush was attempting to gather Democratic support for reforming Social Security.

The support of both sides was required to change the policy, but each feared that the other would renege on a call for change, leaving the policy unchanged and the one who did not renege high, dry, and mobbed by angry seniors. In this table, and in games like this in general, each politician's reward or punishment depends not just on what they do but also on what their fellow player(s) choose to do. The figure below presents a very abstract picture of this story, with numbers standing in for how happy (or, in this case, unhappy) each combination of Bush's and Democrats' actions make them. The more negative one's "payoff," the unhappier each side is. So whose numbers are whose? Well, it's not immediately obvious, but the first of each of the pairs of numbers is Bush's payoff, and the second is Democrats'. Why is that? Well, Bush's name is on the left side, and Democrats's are on the right ... er, well, the TOP right, at least. Well, Bush's is definitely on the left. Just work with me, here, OK?

Let's say that Bush chooses to cooperate. What reward (or punishment) will he receive? The answer depends on what Democrats do. If the Democrats cooperate and give Bush political cover, he will then receive a score of -1; however, if the Democrats fail to support him, Bush gets -10. So let's say that both players decide to cooperate. In that case, you'd see where the row player's (Bush's) and column player's (Democrats') "Cooperate" decisions intersect. In this case, the result is here: Both sides receive a little bad publicity but stick together and reform the program, receiving scores of -1 apiece. (Note: This is the "best" outcome of the game, or at least the one in which the players suffer least, combined). But what will (did) the Democrats actually choose to do? If we look at the Democrats' choices, they ALWAYS receive a higher score by criticizing Bushregardless of what Bush does. Same deal with Bush's ultimate choice: Regardless of what the Democrats end up choosing, Bush would have been happier criticizing them than cooperating. The end result, of course, is that both sides end up hurting each other a lot (-5 each) when they could have been much better off overall (-1 each) by cooperating.

Comprehension Questions:

1. What payoff do the Democrats receive if they cooperates and Bush criticizes?
0
-1
-5
-10

2. Which of the following combinations of strategies results in Bush receiving a payoff of zero?
Democrats criticize, Bush cooperates
Democrats criticize, Bush criticizes
Democrats cooperate, Bush criticizes
Democrats cooperate, Bush cooperates

Score =
Correct answers: